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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, aka LOUISE 
ANN DRAZICH, as an individual, and 
LOUISE A. DRAZICH, as Trustee of 
the Will of MARKO N. DRAZICH, 
deceased, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
ALAN LASSON, MARY D. WHITE, 
And DARRELL L. WHITE, individuals, 
Defendants/Appellee 
CASE NO. 970333-CA 
District Court Case No. 940906967 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: 
In this Brief, "T" refers to the transcript of the proceedings from trial. There are three 
volumes of transcript. "Tl" refers to volume one, "T2" refers to volume two, and "T3" refers to 
volume three. "R" refers to the Record of the District Court, and "Ex" refers to an exhibit, 
followed by the exhibit number. 
Defendants Mary D. White, Darrell L. White and David A. White are no longer parties in 
this action. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
Appellee adopts by this reference the Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction appearing on 
page 1 of Appellants' Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: 
ISSUE ONE: 
IN A QUIET TITLE ACTION, DOES THE PLAINTIFF HAVE 
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE VALIDITY OF ITS TITLE? 
Standards for Review: 
(1) On appeal the appellate court will not upset the trial court's findings and judgment 
unless the evidence were such that all reasonable minds must necessarily so find, and 
the appellate court will review evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly to be 
drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment. 
Butler, Crockett and Walsh Development Corporation v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating 
Co.. 909 P.2d 225,228 (Utah 1996); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Company. 
511 P.2d 145,146 (Utah 1973); Lamkin v. Lynch. 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979). 
(2) A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness and 
therefore no deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions of law. State v. 
Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City 
Ca, 870 P.2d 932 (Utah 1993). 
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ISSUE TWO: 
DOES A CONVEYANCE TO A RAILROAD COMPANY OF 
AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY FOR USE AS A 
RAILROAD SPUR LINE CONSTITUTE A CONVEYANCE 
OF A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST OR MERELY AN EASEMENT, 
SUBJECT TO ABANDONMENT, WHERE THE LOCATION OF 
THE REAL PROPERTY IS NOT DEFINED IN THE CONVEYANCE? 
Standards for Review: 
See standards for Issue One above. 
ISSUE THREE: 
DOES A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CREATE OR 
CONVEY A VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CREATE 
A "TITLE TRANSACTION" SUFFICIENT TO ELIMINATE 
MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT PROTECTIONS? 
Standards for Review: 
See standards for Issue One above. 
ISSUE FOUR: 
IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF, IS THE INCLUSION OF ISSUES 
NOT FOUND IN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW OR JUDGMENT APPROPRIATE TO BE CONSIDERED 
BY THE APPELLATE COURT, OR IS SUCH INCLUSION A 
VIOLATION OF RULE 24 Q) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE? 
Standards for Review: 
Under the Utah Constitution, the appellate court has rule making power, and 
primary responsibility to promulgate and enforce rules relating to the practice of 
law. Utah Constitution.. Art. VIII, Section 4; Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229, 
1237 (Utah 1992). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: 
QUIET TITLE ACTION STATUTE 
78-40-1 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM 
"Action to determine adverse claim to property—authorized." 
MARKETABLE TITLE ACT STATUTES 
57-9-1 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS'ADDENDUM 
"What constitutes marketable record title." 
57-9-2 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS'ADDENDUM 
"Right and interests to which marketable record title is subject." 
57-9-3 Utah Code Annotated. SEE APPELLANTS' ADDENDUM 
"Marketable record title held free and clear of interests, claims and charges." 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM 
Rule 24 (j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. SEE APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This action was originally brought as a quiet title action by Appellants Drazich 
(hereinafter "Drazich") to resolve a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land approximately 78 
feet in length and of varying widths of approximately 11 to 22 feet. The area in dispute 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property") forms a portion of the north boundary of lands 
claimed by Drazich and the south boundary of the Lasson land. The legal descriptions in their 
current deeds of conveyance overlap. 
4 
Drazich claims an interest in the Subject Property on the basis of an 1882 Indenture 
granted to the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (the "Railroad") which allowed 
the Railroad to use certain property as part of its rail system in Salt Lake County, over which a 
spur track was maintained until 1904, at which time the track was removed and the Railroad 
ceased paying taxes on the property. 
On or about September 3, 1958, the Railroad issued a special warranty deed to Building 
Supply Center, which deed was conditioned upon and made subject to existing fence lines and 
other competing interests found on the property. By mesne deeds of record, Drazich claims an 
interest in the Subject Property. 
Lasson claims his interest in the Subject Property from a chain of title dating back to a 
homestead patent issued to James Bell in 1875. The present legal description of the Lasson 
parcel has been used consistently by Salt Lake County taxing authorities since 1927 and appears 
in mesne deeds of record since 1951 down to the 1993 warranty deed to Lasson. 
The issues at trial included the Utah Marketable Record Title Act, adverse possession, 
boundary by acquiescence, and trespass. The trial court's ruling deals solely with the issues 
relating to the Marketable Record Title Act protection of the Lasson title, which issues include 
Lasson's unbroken chain of title, the nature of the original interest conveyed to the Railroad, the 
acts of abandonment by the Railroad, and the validity and effect of the 1958 deed from the 
Railroad to Building Supply Center under which Drazich claims an interest in the Subject 
Property. 
Since the trial court made no ruling on the issues of adverse possession and boundary by 
acquiescence, those issues are not properly before this Court and will not be argued in this Brief 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
This case was tried without jury before the Honorable William B. Bohling in the Third 
District Court for Salt Lake County, in September and November, 1996. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT. 
The respective parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions, and the court took 
the matter under advisement. The court ruled that Lasson had acquired title to the Subject 
Property and that the Lasson Title was protected under the Marketable Record Title Act The 
court adopted the findings and conclusions of the defendant Lasson. A Judgment and Order, 
dated January 3, 1997, was signed and entered by the court. No post-judgment motions relating 
directly to the case were made, and the judgment by the court is a final judgment for purposes of 
this case and this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Lasson acquired title to his property by a warranty deed dated October 25, 1993. (Ex 
3-P). 
2. Drazich obtained a warranty deed to his property in December 1993. (Ex 1-P). 
3. The description contained in the deed to Drazich overlaps and extends into the Lasson 
property to the extent of approximately 22 feet at the easterly end and 11 feet at the westerly end, 
for an average width of approximately 15 feet. The precise description of said overlap is not 
identified by a metes and bounds description. 
4. Title to the area in dispute has a common origin of title by virtue of a Patent issued by 
the United States Government to James Bell. (Ex 15-P). 
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5. The Patentee, James Bell, conveyed fee title to Abraham Helm by a certain 
"Indenture" recorded in Book L, page 283-284 in the official records of Salt Lake County. (Ex 
15-P). 
6. Abraham Helm, by a certain "Indenture" dated August 29, 1882, conveyed to The 
Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company (the "Railroad") an interest in a strip of land which 
extended from the main line of the Railroad's tracks, in a northeasterly direction, over and across 
the lands owned by Helm. The description contained in said Indenture describes the lands to 
which the interest related as being a corridor two rods (33 feet) in width, lying 16 lA feet on 
either side of the center line of an existing railroad track. The actual location of the Railroad's 
track is not described in the Indenture. (Ex 17-D). The transaction between Helm and the 
Railroad was a private transaction. No condemnation or government grants were involved in the 
conveyance to the Railroad. (Ex 17-D) 
7. The railroad tracks lying within the corridor were removed in approximately 1904, 
and no precise legal description of the location of the tracks or of the corridor in which the tracks 
were located was ever recorded. Credible evidence at trial demonstrated considerable 
discrepancy and confusion as to the exact location of the Railroad's tracks. (Ex 5-P; Tl at 66-69; 
T2 at 15-22). 
8. The Railroad ceased paying taxes on the corridor lands in 1904 (Tl at 152-153; Ex 
22-D and 23-D), ceased using the land for railroad purposes at that time, and commenced quit 
claiming its interest in the corridor lands as early as 1926 (Tl at 150; Ex 21-D). 
9. In 1958, the Railroad employed Coon and King Engineers ("Coon and King') to 
attempt to survey the corridor of land upon which the tracks had existed and to establish a legal 
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description for the corridor which had been imprecisely described in the 1882 Indenture. (Ex 12-
D). 
10. The survey prepared by Coon and King revealed the existence and location of a fence 
lying several feet south of what Coon and King believed to be the northerly boundary of the 
historic railroad right-of-way. (Ex 12-D). No clear evidence was presented at trial demonstrating 
that the Coon and King survey accurately reflected the historic location of the Railroad's tracks 
or the corridor through which they traveled. (Tl at 66-69; T2 at 15-22). The location of the 
fence and evidence of its long-term existence evidences that the fence may have been built along 
the northerly boundary of the Railroad's right-of-way. (R at 234; Ex 19-D and 20-D). 
11. Based solely upon the Coon and King Survey, on September 3, 1958, the Railroad 
issued a special warranty deed to Building Supply Center, which was recorded in the official 
records of Salt Lake County on November 26, 1958. (Ex 2-P). The legal description contained 
in the special warranty deed includes the Subject Property. 
12. The special warranty deed contained exceptions and conditions, one of which being 
the "...outstanding rights for any and all...fences...now existing upon, under, along, over or 
across the described premises." (Ex 2-P). 
13. The legal description contained in the Drazich deed dated December, 1993, contained 
that portion of the land described in the 1958 special warranty deed which is in dispute in this 
case. (Ex 1-P). 
14. The legal description contained in Lasson's warranty deed dated October 25, 1993 
(Ex 3-P), which was recorded approximately two (2) months earlier than the Drazich deed (Ex 1-
P) also covers the entire area in dispute, and said legal description has been consistently and 
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continuously used in taxing the Lasson property since 1926 (Tl at 155-156;Ex 24-D) and in 
conveyances of the Lasson property since at least 1951. (Tl at 158;Ex 8-P). 
15. Both Lasson and Drazich claim title to the Subject Property. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
APPELATE REVIEW OF CIVIL ACTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED 
TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
(APPELLANTS DRAZICH) HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
QUIET TITLE ACTIONS 
During the course of the trial both sides presented evidence and testimony in support of 
their respective positions, with the plaintiff, Drazich, being required to shoulder the burden of 
proof By law, the District Court is the trier of fact and great deference should be given by this 
Court to the factual determinations made by the District Court. Based upon the facts presented 
and adopted by the District Court, the conclusions of law issued by the District Court are well 
founded and should be upheld. 
POINT II: 
AN INTERST IN REAL PROPERTY CONVEYED TO A RAILROAD 
FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES, WHICH DOES NOT IDENTIFY THE 
LAND TO BE USED, MUST BE DEEMED AN EASEMENT, SUBJECT 
TO ABANDONMENT, AND NOT A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST. 
Regardless of the language contained in an instrument purporting to convey an interest in 
real property, if the instrument fails to adequately describe the property which it purports to 
convey, and the nature of the use to which the property is put is consistent with a right-of-way or 
easement, the conveyance will be deemed as a matter of law a conveyance of a right-of-way or 
easement, subject to abandonment. The actions and inactions of the Railroad demonstrate that it 
viewed the conveyance as that of a right-of-way or easement and that it intended to and in fact 
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did abandon its property interest prior to 1958. Once the interest is abandoned, it cannot be 
revived. 
POINT III: 
A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CONVEY AN 
EXISTING AND VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CANNOT 
HAVE THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE PROTECTIONS OF 
THE UTAH MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT. 
The Marketable Record Title Act is clear that the protections afforded thereunder are not 
affected by a "stray" or "wild" deed which does not convey an existing and valid interest, such as 
the 1958 deed to Building Supply Center. Similarly, the protections of the Marketable Record 
Title Act are not adversely affected by a deed which, by its terms, recognizes the superior title 
interests of others. 
POINT IV: 
THE ISSUES OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND BOUNDARY 
BY ACQUIESCENCE ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The District Court's ruling in favor of Lasson was based solely upon issues relating 
directly to Lasson's Marketable Record Title Act protections. The issues of adverse possession 
and boundary by acquiescence were and are immaterial to the District Court's findings and 
judgment and this appeal. Drazich's attempts to argue these points clouds the issue before this 
Court and is in direct violation of Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF CIVIL ACTIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED 
TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND NOT OF FACT, AND THE PLAINTIFF 
(APPELLANTS DRAZICH) HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN 
QUIET TITLE ACTIONS. 
It is clear in Utah as in most jurisdictions that the scope of appellate review of civil 
actions is focused on the law applied by the trial court and not on the credible facts upon which 
the trial court makes its decision. See Zions First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A.. 534 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1975); Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co.. 511 P.2d 
145,146 (Utah 1973). Only under the circumstances where the facts relied upon by the trial court 
are "clearly erroneous" will the appellate court review those facts. In the case of Butler, 
Crockett and Walsh Development Corp, supra,, at 228, Justice Zimmerman, speaking for the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
We begin by noting the standard of review in this almost exclusively factual case. 
We reverse a trail court's findings of fact only if they are 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence,' In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In making such a determination, we 
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's finding, and we 
recite the facts in accordance with that standard. Van Dyke v. Chappel, 818 P.2d 
1023, 1024 (Utah 1991). 
As will be discussed hereafter, the facts (or lack thereof) presented at trial by Drazich mandated 
the decision made by the District Court in favor of Lasson. 
In bringing this quiet title action, Drazich had the burden of proving that its chain of title 
was superior to that of Lasson, and it utterly failed to do so. (See Olseru supra., at 146, and 
Colman v. Butkovich, 538 P.2d 188 (Utah 1975)). In order to demonstrate superior chain of 
title, Drazich had to prove at trial (1) that the conveyance to the Railroad was a conveyance of a 
valid and continuing fee simple interest in the Subject Property and (2) that the 1958 deed from 
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the Railroad to Building Supply Center conveyed a valid interest in the Subject Property. As 
will be discussed below, Drazich presented no credible evidence demonstrating that the 1882 
Indenture to the Railroad contained a legal description of the property purportedly conveyed to 
the Railroad sufficient to meet the requirements of a fee simple conveyance. Further, as will be 
discussed below, Drazich presented no evidence refuting Lasson's evidence that the Railroad 
abandoned whatever interests it may have had in the Subject property by, at the latest, 1926. 
Drazich also failed to provide evidence that the exceptions and conditions shown on the 1958 
Coon and King survey and described in the 1958 deed from the Railroad to Building Supply 
Center did not exempt out the Subject Property. 
In short, Drazich failed to prove to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that any valid or 
continuing interest in the Subject Property was conveyed to it or its predecessors in interest. 
Without such proof, the 1958 deed, upon which Drazich relies for its root of title (which has an 
age less than the forty (40) years required under the Utah Marketable Record Title Act), is totally 
without legal effect under the plain language of the Utah Marketable Record Title Act and Utah 
property law generally. (See Section 57-9-1, Utah Code Annotated; Olsen, supra., at 147-148). 
The District Court found that Drazich did not meet its burden of proof based on the facts 
(or lack thereof) presented at trial, and this determination by the District Court should be upheld 
in accordance with the standards of review long established by this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
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II. 
AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY CONVEYED TO A RAILROAD 
FOR RAILROAD PURPOSES, WHICH DOES NOT IDENTIFY THE LAND 
TO BE USED, MUST BE DEEMED AN EASEMENT, SUBJECT TO 
ABANDONMENT, AND NOT A FEE SIMPLE INTEREST. 
In its Brief, Drazich argues that the fact that the 1882 Indenture in favor of the Railroad 
contained "grant, bargain and sale" and "fee" language should be determinative of the issue of 
whether the conveyance is one of a fee simple interest in property or merely an easement, subject 
to abandonment. In support of this position, Drazich refers the Court to rather ancient case law, 
none of which is directly applicable to the case at bar. 
In each of the cases cited by Drazich, the courts had the benefit of an instrument that not 
only contained "grant, bargain and sale" language but also had an understandable and locatable 
legal description of the property being conveyed. By contrast, in this case the Court is dealing 
with an Indenture that does not contain a precise or locatable legal description of the Railroad 
property. Drazich's expert title witness, Gary Carlson ("Carlson") testified at trial that the legal 
description contained in the Indenture was "very ambiguous." (Tl at 93). Drazich's expert 
witness, Jack L. DeMass ("DeMass") testified at trial that neither the 1882 Indenture nor the 
1910 Railroad Affidavit (the "Affidavit") (Ex P-5) contained a legal description or drawing that 
could be physically tied to any point on the ground. (Tl at 66-69). Similarly, Lasson's expert 
witness, M. Carl Larsen ("Larsen"), testified at trial that based upon his review of and extensive 
research concerning the Indenture and the Affidavit, no location of the spur line could or can be 
determined. (T2 at 15-22). No credible evidence was presented at trial that even the Railroad or 
its surveyor knew where the spur line was actually located. No one was called at trial to testify 
on behalf of Coon and King, the Railroad's surveyor, as to how its survey was prepared. In fact, 
DeMass, Drazich's expert surveyor witness, testified that he could not determine from his review 
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of the Coon and King Survey what data, if any, Coon and King used to attempt to relocate the 
Railroad spur in 1958. (Tl at 66-69). 
In a remarkably similar case in the State of Washington, in which a county was 
attempting to claim ownership of property which had been originally described in an ancient 
deed as being "...20 feet on each side of line of said road as surveyed...," the Washington Court 
of Appeals ruled that the legal description of the property contained in the deed was insufficient 
because there was no reference in the deed to a specific survey and because there was evidence 
presented at trial that a surveyor could not precisely locate the property given the description 
contained in the deed. In making this ruling, the Appeals Court stated: 
Deeds must contain an adequate legal description of the real property to be 
conveyed (Citations omitted). An inadequate legal description is a violation of 
the statute of frauds (Citations omitted). No reference was made to a specific 
survey and there was evidence a surveyor could not locate the property, given the 
description contained in the deed. The cases cited by the County are not 
dispositive as they hold specific reference to the second document must be made 
within the deed. 
Sparks v. Douglas County. 695 P.2d 588, 589 (Wash. App. 1985). 
Other modern case law holds that an instrument purporting to create an interest in real 
property which fails to provide an adequate legal description of the property which it purports to 
convey is either (a) invalid on its face (see Colman. supra, at 189), or (b) conveys an easement 
rather than a full possessory interest. (See Fetzer v. Cities Service Oil Co.. 572 Fed.2d 1250 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (lack of clarity in land description may indicate the conveyance of an easement rather 
than a full possessory interest); Hutson et al. v. The Agricultural Ditch and Reservoir Co., 723 
P.2d 736 (Colo. 1986) (a document purporting to convey a fee interest must at least provide a 
means of identifying the property conveyed); Sherman et al. v. Petroleum Exploration et al., 132 
14 
SW.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1939) (imprecise description creates an easement only, even though 
warranty language is used in the conveying instrument)). 
Clearly, neither the Indenture itself nor the Affidavit provides the clarity necessary to 
create a fee simple interest in the Railroad. In Colman, supra, at 189, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[u]nder no circumstances can [an] affidavit initiate title.... It is neither a conveyance 
nor a transfer of marketable title in any sense of the word—statutory or otherwise." 
By the admission of Drazich's own expert surveyor witness, the actual location of the 
spur line cannot at this date be determined (Tl at 66-69), and there was no credible evidence 
presented at trial demonstrating that the Coon and King Survey upon which Drazich's alleged 
root of title is based was in fact correct. (Tl at 66-69). By contrast, there was significant 
testimony and evidence given at trial by Lasson's expert surveyor witness, Larsen, to the effect 
that it is more likely than not that the spur track was moved to a position south of its original line 
sometime before the track was removed in 1904. (T2 at 21). This is a key element in this Case 
since the location of the Railroad's property interest under the original Indenture was tied 
directly to the centerline of the tracks. (Ex 7-P). The possible, and according to Larsen probable, 
relocation of the tracks prior to 1904 makes the "legal description" found in the 1882 Indenture 
even more ambiguous and confusing. Drazich introduced no evidence or testimony at trial 
refuting (or even responding to) this important point. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court was justified in determining that 
the location of the Railroad spur cannot be accurately or adequately determined. Without such 
location, the law requires that the Indenture be interpreted as either being void on its face, or at 
the most as creating an easement, subject to abandonment, but certainly not a fee simple interest. 
(See Colman, supra.; Fetzer, supra.; Hutson, supra.; and Sherman, supra). 
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Equally as troubling to Drazich's case at trial were the uncontested facts surrounding the 
Railroad's own statements and actions relative to the property interest conveyed in the Indenture. 
The Affidavit (Ex 5-P) refers to the interest conveyed to the Railroad as a "right-of-way" (not fee 
simple) and indicates (a) that the track was removed in 1904 and (b) that the right-of-way had 
not been abandoned as of 1910. Why would the Railroad have been so concerned about the 
possibility of abandonment if in fact it thought it owned a fee simple interest? Further 
uncontested evidence of abandonment was introduced at trial to the effect that the Railroad 
ceased paying taxes on the right-of-way in 1904 (Ex 22-D and 23-D; Tl at 154) and began quit 
claiming its interest in the spur line property as early as 1926 (Ex 21-D; Tl at 150), thus making 
continued use of the property by the Railroad impossible. The Railroad's own records, 
memoranda, and correspondence surrounding the 1958 Coon and King Survey and the 1958 deed 
to Building Supply Center indicate that the Railroad was not sure what it owned (if anything) (Ex 
18-D) and therefore was not willing to warrant any property within existing fence lines to 
Building Supply Center, Drazich's predecessor in interest. (Ex 2-P). 
The District Court properly took all of these factors into account in determining that the 
interest conveyed to the Railroad was in fact an easement, subject to abandonment, and that the 
Railroad had in fact abandoned the easement prior to 1958. (R at 235-236). 
III. 
A "STRAY" OR "WILD" DEED WHICH DOES NOT CONVEY AN 
EXISTING AND VALID INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
CANNOT HAVE THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING THE PROTECTIONS 
OF THE UTAH MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT. 
It was uncontested at trial that Lasson has an unbroken chain of title to his property which 
has existed in excess of forty (40) years, thus making him eligible for protection under the Utah 
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Marketable Record Title Act. (Section 57-9-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated (the "Act')). Section 
57-9-2 of the Act sets forth certain exceptions to the effectiveness of the Act in protecting 
property rights. The only exception at issue in this case appears in Section 57-9-2(4) of the Act 
which reads as follows: 
[The marketable record title is subject to] any interest out of a title transaction 
which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date of the root of title from 
which the unbroken chain of title of record is started, except that the recording 
does not revive or give validity to any interest which has been extinguished prior 
to the time of the recording by the operation of Section 57-9-3. . . . (Emphasis 
added). 
As discussed in Section II above, no credible evidence was introduced at trial locating with any 
precision the property in which the Railroad claimed an interest. Uncontested evidence 
presented at trial clearly showed action and inaction on the part of the Railroad demonstrating an 
abandonment of any interest which it might have once claimed. Based on these two factors 
alone, the District Court was justified in determining that "...[n]o 'title transaction,' as that term 
is used in Section 5 7-9-2(4)... occurred so as to break Defendant's (Lasson's) chain of title..." (R 
at 236). 
An additional basis for the District Court's ruling is found in the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the preparation of the 1958 deed to Building Supply Center (in which Drazich 
claims his root of title to the Subject Property) and the language of the deed itself. As previously 
discussed, inter-company letters and memoranda executed and delivered by the Railroad prior to 
issuance of the 1958 deed indicated that the Railroad was unsure of the exact location of the 
right-of-way (Ex 18-D; Tl at 104,106) and was concerned about the effect of a fence line shown 
on a map prepared by the Railroad prior to the preparation of the Coon and King Survey (Ex 18-
D;T1 at 107-110). 
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Prior to issuance of the 1958 deed and as a result of inter-company directions regarding 
the sale to Building Supply Center, the Railroad retained the services of Coon and King to 
provide what has been described as a "certified survey." (Tl at 105; Ex 12-P). Both of the expert 
surveyor witnesses, DeMass and Larsen, testified that they could not verify the accuracy of the 
Coon and King Survey as to the exact location of the Railroad's spur line (Tl at 66-67; T2 at 48-
49). Nevertheless, the unverified survey, when completed, showed a fence line running along 
the south boundary of the existing Lasson and White properties. (T2 at 25-26; Ex 12-P). 
After the Coon and King Survey was completed, the Railroad authorized the issuance of 
a special warranty deed to Building Supply Center containing certain exceptions and conditions. 
(Ex 18-D at p. 5). Specifically, the conveyance was made subject to (and did not contain 
warranties as to) "...all outstanding rights for any and all...fences...existing upon ...the said 
described premises." (Ex 2-P). Drazich argues in its Brief that since Building Supply Center 
received a special warranty deed, this conveyance must be deemed a "title transaction" 
disrupting Lasson's chain of title under the Act. This simply is not the case. Since the 1958 
deed cannot be tied by evidence back to the 1882 Indenture or the 1910 Affidavit, the deed, by 
definition, is a "stray" or "wild" deed. In reviewing Utah law relating to the effect of "stray" 
deeds, Judge McKay, speaking for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
When , as here, the relevant state law is inconclusive and ambiguous on the effect 
of a stray deed, we are not convinced that, as a matter of federal law, a party 
should be considered so unreasonable in failing to have discovered the existence 
of a claim that he will be charged with constructive knowledge of the claim. The 
doctrine of constructive notice, which creates a fiction and deals with hypothetical 
facts, is a harsh doctrine which should be resorted to reluctantly and construed 
strictly (citations omitted). 
Amoco Production Company v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir. 1980). 
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In the Amoco case, the court was dealing with the issue of constructive notice. Drazich 
has argued that its "stray" deed is sufficient to destroy Lasson's protections under the Marketable 
Record Title Act. Like Judge McKay and the Tenth Circuit, Lasson contends that such an 
application of the ambiguous rulings of the Utah Courts in the past concerning "stray" deeds 
would be "harsh doctrine" and violative of the oft stated and well established principal that 
"...boundary lines which have long been established and accepted by those who should be 
concerned should be left undisturbed in order to leave at rest matters which may have resulted in 
controversy and litigation...." Oteen, supra., at 147. 
This principal is particularly relevant in the case at bar for two reasons. First, as 
previously discussed, the "stray" deed cannot revive or give validity to an interest which was 
extinguished prior to the effective date of the deed (Section 57-9-2(4)), and second, the 
conveyance contained in the deed itself was specifically made "subject to" the rights of others 
(including Lasson's predecessors) owning or claiming lands within the existing fence lines. It is 
also interesting to note that during cross examination, Mr. Carlson, Drazich's expert title witness, 
admitted that the "subject to" provisions raise ambiguities as to what was actually conveyed in 
the 1958 deed. The relevant portions of that examination are as follows: 
Q. And in the 1958 deed, the Special Warranty Deed which we 
have discussed this morning, have you had an opportunity to 
review that document? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And are you familiar with the conveyance language in that 
document? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. You are familiar with it? Fine. In the language conveying 
subject to certain condition, what does that mean to you as a 
title examiner? 
A. Well, it means that there may or may not be something there. 
Generally speaking, that universal-type language that's used 
could mean there is something there and could mean there 
isn't anything there. 
Q. So unless you study what's actually on the ground or what 
parol evidence perhaps there is surrounding the deed, you 
really wouldn't know what was conveyed in that instrument. 
Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(Tl at 90-91). Lasson's expert title witness, Arlen Taylor, agreed with Mr. Carlson and 
indicated that such language in the deed negatively affects the insurability of the conveyance. 
(Tl at 160). Thus both expert witnesses could not verify what, if anything, was conveyed to 
Drazich's predecessor in interest by the 1958 deed. 
Based upon the events and document surrounding the preparation of the Coon and King 
Survey, the unverifiable Survey itself, the clear language of the deed to Building Supply Center, 
and the testimony of the expert title witnesses at trial, the District Court was more than justified 
in holding that no conveyance of the Subject Property occurred as a result of the 1958 deed and 
that the deed did not constitute a "title transaction" sufficient to eliminate or lessen Lasson's 
protections under the Act. 
IV. 
THE ISSUES OF ADVERSE POSSESION 
AND BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
It is perfectly clear from the Record in this Case that the decision of the District Court in 
favor of Lasson was based solely on protections afforded Lasson under the Utah Marketable 
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Record Title Act. (R at 231-241). Although thoroughly briefed and argued at trial, the issues of 
adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence were determined by the District Court to be 
irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of the case. (T3 at 41-43). Nevertheless, Drazich's 
counsel has taken approximately twelve pages of his Brief to reargue these points. The inclusion 
of these irrelevant and immaterial matters in the Appellant's Brief is in direct violation of Rule 
24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states: 
(j) Requirements and Sanctions. All briefs under this rule must 
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and 
the court may assess attorney's fees against the offending lawyer. 
(Emphasis added). 
(See Appellee's Addendum). Since the issues of adverse possession and boundary by 
acquiescence were immaterial and irrelevant to the District Court's decision on this matter, 
Lasson has elected not to respond in this Brief to the arguments on these issues contained in the 
Drazich Brief. Should this Court desire to know of Lasson's position on these matters, the Court 
is directed to the Trial Brief of Defendant Alan Lasson (R at 112-161) and the Closing Brief of 
Defendant Alan Lasson (R at 201-215). 
Further, Lasson respectfully requests that this Court impose appropriate sanctions upon 
Drazich's counsel for including these immaterial and irrelevant matters in his Brief by (1) 
striking the irrelevant and immaterial portion of the Appellants' Brief, (2) granting Lasson costs 
and attorney's fees incurred by Lasson in this appellate proceeding, and (3) granting such other 
relief as the Court may find appropriate in the premises. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case was originally brought by Drazich to attempt to quiet title to the Subject 
Property which it believed it owned by virtue of a 1958 deed granted to its predecessor in interest 
by the Railroad. As the moving party in this action, Drazich had the burden of proving (1) that 
the Railroad at some point acquired a fee simple interest in the Subject Property, (2) that the 
property used by the Railroad could and can be accurately located, (3) that the Railroad did not 
abandon or otherwise forfeit its interest in the Subject Property prior to 1958, (4) that the fence 
line exceptions found on the 1958 Coon and King Survey and in the 1958 deed did not recognize 
the validity of the rights of other owners of property lying within said fence lines, and (5) that in 
all respects the 1958 deed accurately described and ties directly back to a portion of the property 
originally used by the Railroad. We submit that Drazich failed at trial to meet its burden of proof 
on all of these issues. 
The evidence presented at trial clearly indicates that the original location of the 
Railroad's spur line cannot be determined, and therefore it is impossible to determine whether in 
fact the 1958 deed that created the overlap is accurate. The one thing that was clear at trial, and 
the fact upon which the District Court relied in reaching its decision on this matter, was that 
Lasson and his predecessors in interest held title to the entirety of the Lasson property from 
1927, according to the County tax rolls (Tl at 157; Ex 24-D), and since at least 1951, according 
to deeds of record. (Tl at 157; Ex 8-P). Thus Lasson has and enjoys the protections of the Utah 
Marketable Record Title Act, which the unsubstantiated and unverifiable deed upon which 
Drazich relies for his root of title simply cannot affect. 
In discussing the burden of proof of a plaintiff in a quiet title action, Chief Justice 
Henroid stated: "[o]ne cannot prevail on the weakness of his adversary's title, but only on the 
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strength of his own." Colman v. Butkovich. 538 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1975). The District Court 
was more than justified in ruling in favor of Lasson based on the lack of evidence presented at 
trial by Drazich in support of its claim to title. 
Therefore, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed and costs and attorney 
fees of this appeal should be awarded to Appellee Lasson for the reasons herein stated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *T- day of October, 1997. 
DAVID P. HIRSCHI 
Attorney for Appellee Alan Lasson 
2224 North 640 West 
West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
(801) 296-1420 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Brant H. Wall and Gregory B. Wall, attorneys for appellants Drazich, 
at Suite 800, Boston Building, 9 East Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on the %-
day of October, 1997. 
DA 
Attorney at Law 
24 
ADDENDUM 
STATUTE 
Section 78-40-1 Utah Code Annotated 
CONSTITUTION 
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 4 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
QUIET TITLE 78-40-1 
Section 
78-40-12. 
78-40-13. 
78-40-1. 
Service of summons and conclu-
siveness of judgment. 
Judgment on default — Court 
must require evidence — Con-
clusiveness of judgment. 
Action to determine adverse claim to property — 
Authorized. 
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an 
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property 
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-40-1. 
Cross-References. — Action brought in 
county where property situated, § 78-13-1. 
Allowance for improvements made under 
color of title, §§ 57-6-1 et seq., § 78-40-5. 
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4. 
Limitations of actions, § 78-12-1 et seq. 
Tax sales of real property, § 59-2-1303 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adverse possession. 
Due process. 
Heirs. 
Judgment. 
Nature and scope of proceedings. 
Option to purchase. 
Presumptions and burden of proof. 
Proof of claim. 
Tax titles or claims. 
Water rights. 
What claims may be assailed. 
What constitutes "claim" of "estate or interest." 
Wrongful possession. 
Adverse possession. 
One claiming by adverse possession does not 
arrest the running of this section in his favor by 
commencing an action to quiet title. Welner v. 
Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 P. 490, 1914C Ann. 
Cas. 1175 (1911). 
Due process . 
Repossession of real property under a con-
tract and the quiet title procedure did not 
constitute state action under the fourteenth 
amendment, thereby giving the vendees a right 
to reasonable notice prior to the destruction of 
their security interest, where the state did not 
create the nghts leading to the vendees' depri-
vation of their interest m the contract. Dirks v. 
Goodwill, 754 P.2d 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Heirs. 
Heirs could bring action to quiet title though 
there had been no adjudication of heirship. 
Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 Utah 420, 29 P.2d 
355 (1934). 
Judgment . 
Court of equity, in an action to quiet title, 
may not only enter judgment quieting title, but 
may mclude in the judgment a general order 
restraining the defendant from asserting any 
claim adverse to, and in derogation of, the 
plaintiff's right, and may prohibit the defen-
dant from doing any act that would tend to 
impair or destroy such right. Richey v. Beus, 31 
Utah 262, 87 P. 903 (1906). 
Decree in an action to quiet title can only 
bind the parties to the action. Fisher v. Davis, 
77 Utah 81, 291 P. 493 (1930). 
Effect of a decree quieting title is not to vest 
title, but to perfect an existing title as against 
other claimants. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah 
1979). 
Nature and scope of proceedings. 
The language used in this section is very 
comprehensive. In terms, it authorizes an ac-
tion by any person against another who claims 
an estate or interest m real property adverse to 
him, for the purpose of determining such ad-
verse claim. Bullion, Beck & Champion Mining 
Co. v. Eureka Hill Mining Co., 5 Utah 3, 11 P. 
515 (1886), appeal dismissed, 131 U.S. 431, 9 S. 
Ct. 796, 33 L. Ed. 224 (1888). 
Action to quiet title is an action at law and 
thus either side, upon request, is entitled to a 
jury trial. Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 
P.2d 250 (1958). 
Statutory action to quiet title is an action in 
rem, or quasi in rem, requiring either a state or 
federal court to obtain jurisdiction over the 
property in dispute before proceeding to adju-
dication on the merits. 1st Nat'l Credit Corp. v. 
Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634 (D. Utah 1981). 
Option to purchase . 
Validly exercised option to purchase cannot 
fail for the reason that funds are secured from 
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are presumed to be proper unless there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain them Schad v 
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 345, 496 P 2d 263 (1972), 
Wilson v Turner, 27 Utah 2d 368, 496 P 2d 
711 (1972), Leggroan v Turner, 27 Utah 2d 
403, 497 P 2 d 17 (1972), Zumbrunnen v 
Turner, 27 Utah 2d 428, 497 P 2d 34 (1972) 
Legislative enlargement or abridgement of 
powers. 
The powers given court by this provision 
cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legisla-
ture State ex rel Robinson v Durand, 36 Utah 
93, 104 P 760 (1908) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law — Judi 
cial Socialization An Empirical Study, 11 J 
Contemp L 423 (1985) 
Key Numbers. — Courts <&=» 248 
Sec, 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges 
pro tempore — Regulation of practice of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence to be used 
m the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process The 
Legislature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro tem-
pore to perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law m Utah The 
Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of law, including admission 
to practice lawT and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice 
law 
History Const 1896, L. 1984 (2nd S S ) , 
S .JR. 1 
Compiler's Notes — Former Article VIII 
contained no comparable provisions 
Cross-References . — Supreme Court rule-
making process Rule 11-101 Code of Judicial 
Administration 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Judge pro tempore 
Regulation of judicial conduct 
Regulation of practice of lav, 
Cited 
Judge pro tempore. 
Appointment of a judge pro tempore to hear 
and decide a divorce action does not violate the 
provisions of § 30-3-4, since a properly ap-
pointed pro tempore judge becomes the equal 
m every respect to the regular judge Harward 
v Harward, 526 P 2d 1183 (Utah 1974) 
Circuit judge appointed by state court ad 
ministrator to serve temporarily as a district 
judge pursuant to § 78-3 24 and former 
§ 78-4-15 was not a judge pro tempore and was 
not subject to the legal restrictions pertaining 
to that status Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140 
(Utah 1982) 
Regulation of judicial conduct. 
The Supreme Court is constitutionally obli-
gated to review the Judicial Conduct Commis-
sion s proceedings, but the court has no author-
ity to undertake initial review of matters re-
lated to compliance with the judicial canons of 
ethics In re Greenwood, 135 Utah Adv Rep 
27 (1990) 
Regulation of practice of law. 
This section gives the Supreme Court the 
power to govern the practice of law and to dis-
cipline bar members This power necessarily 
includes control over the procedures used to 
discipline bar members In re Crandall, 784 
P 2 d 1193 (Utah 1989) 
Cited m Stewart v Coffman, 748 P 2d 579 
(Utah Ct App 1988) 
188 
,715 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 24 
gale 23B. Motion to remand for determinat ion of inef-
fective ass istance of counsel . 
(a) Grounds for motion; t ime. A party to an appeal in a 
criminal case may move the court to remand the case to the 
trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant 
to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall 
t>e available only upon an allegation of facts constituting 
ineffective assistance of counsel not fully appearing in the 
record on appeal. The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of 
the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good cause, the court 
may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of the 
appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to 
be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit 
the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own 
motion at any time if the claim has been raised and the motion 
would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of 
the motion shall conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The 
motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging 
facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the 
claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered 
by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient perfor-
mance. A response shall be filed within 20 days after the 
motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days after the 
response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion, 
affidavits, and memoranda, the court may order that the case 
be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of 
entering findings of fact relevant to the claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that 
the attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest 
upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw 
and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for 
briefs shall be vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand 
under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these 
rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay 
is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the 
parties or upon the court's motion. 
, (e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand 
the trial court shall conduct hearings and take evidence as 
necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine 
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as 
practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be 
upon the proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be 
a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court shall enter 
written findings of fact. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the 
inclusion of all proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of 
the trial court and the court reporter shall prepare the record 
fifths supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If 
the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has 
k e n transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
^ur t shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemen-
tal proceedings upon preparation of the supplemental record, 
u the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
tas not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of 
the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
Proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the 
record from the trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify 
^e parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument 
^ d e r these rules. Errors claimed to have been made during 
the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
^ e w a b l e under the same standards as the review of errors 
^ other appeals. The findings of fact entered pursuant to this 
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of 
findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of t h e ap p e l l an t . The brief of the appellant shall 
contain under appropriate headings and in the order indi-
cated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the 
court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be 
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal 
contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the 
addendum, with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically 
arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and 
other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the 
brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, 
including for each issue: the standaid of appellate review 
with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue 
was preserved in the trial court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved in the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, 
rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determina-
tive of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal 
shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If 
the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation 
alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an 
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first 
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of 
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A 
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references 
to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to 
the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of argu-
ments, suitably paragraphed, shall be: a succinct conden-
sation of the arguments actually made in the body of the 
brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading 
under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the con-
tentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the 
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief 
sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no 
addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The adden-
dum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so 
makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of 
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or 
regulation of central importance cited in the bnef but 
not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of 
the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court 
opinion of central importance to the appeal but not 
available to the court as part of a regularly published 
reporter service; and 
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(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of 
central importance to the determination of the ap-
peal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, 
the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the 
contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Br ief of t h e appe l l ee . The brief of the appellee shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, 
except that the appellee need not include: 
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the 
appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appel-
lant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not in-
cluded in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee 
may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to 
the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has cross-
appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response 
of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. 
Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set 
forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall 
conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and 
(10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed except with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(d) Refe rences in br iefs t o p a r t i e s . Counsel will be 
expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a 
minimum references to parties by such designations as "ap-
pellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the designa-
tions used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or 
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the 
employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) Re fe rences in br iefs to t h e r e c o r d . References shall 
be made to the pages of the original record as paginated 
pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any statement of the 
evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursu-
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to exhibits shall be made 
to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the 
admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be 
made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) L e n g t h of br iefs . Except by permission of the court, 
principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs 
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the 
table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the 
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases 
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth 
the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases invo lv ing c ross -appea l s . If a cross-
appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be 
deemed the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rule 26, 
unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain 
the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well 
as the answer to the brief of the appellant and shall not exceed 
50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief which 
contains an answer to the original issues raised by the 
appellee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response 
to the issues raised in the appellant's opening brief. The 
appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 pages in length. 
The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the 
appellant's answers to the original issues raised by the appel-
lee/cross-appellant's first brief. The lengths specified by this 
rule are exclusive of table of contents, table of authorities, and 
addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the court. 
The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause 
shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases invo lv ing mu l t i p l e appellant* 
appe l lees . In cases involving more than one appellan4 
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of n? 
appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief a^j 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part!* 
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply britf 
(i) C i ta t ion of s u p p l e m e n t a l a u t h o r i t i e s . When n ^ 
nent and significant authorities come to the attention of 
party after that party's brief has been filed, or after 
on] 
argument but before decision, a party may promptly advii* 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth th* 
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in th* 
Supreme Court. An original letter and seven copies shall bt 
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference eith*f 
to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which th# 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument staU 
the reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall 
be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly l imits 
(j) R e q u i r e m e n t s a n d sanc t i ons . All briefs under thii 
rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically tf» 
ranged with proper headings and free from burdensome 
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, oa 
motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may asseif 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers . The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy 
cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 
1995.) 
Rule 25. Brief of a n a m i c u s c u r i a e o r guardian ad 
l i tem. 
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad litem 
representing a minor who is not a party to the appeal may bt 
filed only if accompanied by written consent of all parties, Of 
by leave of court granted on motion or at the request of tb# 
court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of tbl 
applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicul 
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except as aU 
parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae or guardian M 
litem shall file its brief within the time allowed the party 
whose position as to affirmance or reversal the amicus curi*# 
or guardian ad litem will support, unless the court for cauH 
shown otherwise orders. A motion of an amicus curiae Of 
guardian ad litem to participate in the oral argument will &• 
granted when circumstances warrant in the court's discretion. 
Ru le 26. F i l ing a n d se rv ice of br iefs . 
(a) T ime for se rv ice a n d filing br iefs . Briefs shall. bf 
deemed filed on the date of the postmark if first-class mail * 
utilized. The appellant shall serve and file a brief w i t h * V ? 
days after date of notice from the clerk of the appellate w w 
pursuant to Rule 13, unless a motion for summary disposiw 
of the appeal or a motion to remand for determination 
ineffective assistance of counsel has been previously tf* 
posed, in which event service and filing shall be within 3U «7 
from the denial of such motion. The appellee, or in cf*jj 
involving a cross-appeal, the appellee/cross-appellant, 
serve and file a brief within 30 days after service o* . 
appellant's brief. In cases involving cross-appeals, the aP|*j£ 
lant shall serve and file the second brief described m ^ , 
24(g) within 30 days after service of the appellee/cross-apPJ 
lant's brief. A reply brief may be served and filed %•-* 
appellant or the appellee/cross-appellant in cases _ invohnflj 
cross-appeals. If a reply brief is filed, it shall be serv j ^ 
filed within 30 days after the filing and service of ^^{JjJJj 
lee's brief or the appellant's second brief in cases i n j$ 
cross-appeals. If oral argument is scheduled fewer ^ ^ # 
after the filing of appellee's brief, the reply brief a1 ^ days i 
filed at least 5 days prior to oral argument. By stipu latioo 
fi* 
